The Law Office of Kurt H King

August 11, 2017

Roadway exception language in Deeds refers to an Easement

Filed under: Litigation,Real Estate,Uncategorized — kurthking @ 4:11 pm
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The language in deeds often “excepts” the roadway.  What does that mean?–the land under the roadway is not conveyed?–an easement is created?  Did the fee title to the land stay with a previous landowner, was it never conveyed, or what?

At least one Missouri case says that such language creates an easement for the roadway with fee simple held by the person who owns the land under the road.

In Ogg v. Mediacom, 142 S.W.3d 801, section III (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 2004), the court of appeals declared:

“Use of terms such as “right of way,” “road,” or “roadway” as a limitation on

land is a strong, almost conclusive, indication that the interest is an easement.”

 

Apparently, fee ownership belongs to the person who owns the land beneath the road or road right-of-way.

 

Kurt H. King

816.781.6000

20 E. Franklin, Liberty, Clay County, Missouri 64068

Litigation, Personal Injury, General Matters

 

July 18, 2017

Kansas Under-Insured Motorist Coverage

Under Kansas statute K.S.A. 40-284(b), Under-Insured Motorist (“UIM”) automobile coverage pays only “to the extent such coverage exceeds the limits of the bodily injury coverage carried by the owner or operator of the other motor vehicle.” Kerns v. Alliance Indemnity Co., Slip Op. 79948 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. April 25, 2017).

So, if you carry the minimum 25/50 (in thousands of dollars), your UIM coverage does not pay you a dime because the other driver will have at least the required minimum 25/50 of bodily injury coverage.  Since your $25k of UIM does not exceed the other driver’s $25k of bodily injury, you get zero from your UIM.

(Note: Kansas law prohibits “stacking” of UIM coverage.  K.S.A. 40-284(d))

Even if you buy more than the 25/50 minimum of UIM, it still pays you nada if the other driver has as much or more bodily injury coverage.  For example, if you carry $100k in UIM, and are hit by another driver with $100k in bodily injury coverage, your UIM pays nothing because your UIM of $100k is no greater than the other driver’s $100k of bodily injury coverage!

We wonder if insurance agents explain this to the people buying insurance from them.  If they are, one would expect the buyer to either waive UIM coverage or buy more than teh minimum 25/50 amount.

Kurt H. King, Attorney at Law

20 E. Franklin, Liberty, Clay County, Missouri

816.781.6000

Personal Injury, Workers’ Compensation, Litigation, General Matters

November 21, 2016

EMBRYO IN VITRO–Missouri’s McQeen v. Gadberry Case

November 15, 2016, the Eastern District issued its opinion in a Missouri first-impression pre-embryo in vitro divorce case–McQueen v. Garberry, ED 103138 (Mo. Ct. App.).

The Court’s decision runs long but warrants a full read; its core holding/ruling is:

Some key facts discussed by the Court include:
1.  Neither wife McQueen (attorney) or husband-Gadberry (soldier, MBA) are impotent and each can procreate children naturally–their reason for using in vitro was husband’s impending tour of combat duty–two of the four embryos were implanted and born alive and presumably well to the couple;
2.  Custody sharing of the couple’s two children was said to be difficult;
3.  Husband did not want more children with McQueen, who filed for the divorce;
4.  Wife may have pulled some shenanigans by handwriting in the margin of the embryo storage documentation that “use” of the embryos would go to her in case of divorce–husband testified that language was not there when he signed it; she used blue and black ink in the same area; signed but notarized later; etc., causing the trial court to find the documents to be insufficient to hold husband in agreement on such an important issue.
Ultimately, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s order casting the embryos as marital property of a “special character” and requiring they be stored unless and until both McQueen and Gadberry execute a sufficient written agreement otherwise.
Kurt H. King
Law Office of Kurt H. King, 20 E. Franklin Street, Liberty, Clay County, Missouri 64068
816.781.6000
Missouri Family Law, Personal Injury, Workers’ Compensation, General Matters

November 9, 2016

Missouri Fence Law

In Chapter 272 of Missouri’s Revised Statutes, you find two sets of fence law back to back, General fence law up front.  Counties can opt for the second set of statutes (Optional fence law) if they prefer.    A minority consisting of northern Missouri counties use the Optional version more in tune with rural areas.

It can be tricky finding out if a particular county has opted out, as it may have happened years before the current county officers took office.  No one at the courthouse may know or want to take the time to check old records and find out for you.  While each county should have its fence law written and available to the public, some do not.  You may be referred to the University of Missouri agricultural extension office for a list or map of those counties which have opted out.  A good article and map is presently available on-line.

While there are several differences in the two fence laws, an important one is that under the General fence law a landowner who does NOT place livestock up against the fence need not pay for half the cost of a boundary fence with his neighbor who does run livestock against the fence.  Section 272.132.

Amazing how so many of us are just a generation or two away from our farm ancestors, but have never encountered the fence laws our grandparents knew well.

Keep in mind the old axiom “a good fence makes for good neighbors”–it still holds water.  Surveys cost but save the expense of rebuilding an off-line fence and paying lawyers on lawsuits claiming trespass, adverse possession, tacking, quiet title, and so on.

Kurt H. King

Law Office of Kurt H. King

816.781.6000

20 E. Franklin, Liberty, Clay County, Missouri 64068

General Litigation and Matters, Personal Injury, Workers’ Compensation, Family Law

May 11, 2016

MISSOURI PRISON TIME SERVED CREDITED TO BOTH THE PAROLE VIOLATION AND THE NEW CRIME

Filed under: Litigation,Uncategorized — kurthking @ 8:29 pm
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The May 3, 2016, slip opinion in Yowell v. Missouri Department of Corrections (Mo. Ct. App. WD79200) holds that where the same act (1) violates probation and (2) constitutes the new crime charged against the defendant, time served on the parole violation must be credited against the sentence on the new charge as well.

The facts of this case twist and turn tortuously, but a sentence on page 8 of the opinion hits the spot:

“[T]he incident that led to the new charge is the exact behavior that led to the probation violation and revocation,

meaning that, without the consumption of alcohol, Mr. Yowell would remain free from custody.”

Because the parole violation resulted from the same act/behavior as did the the new charges/offense, the two are “related” for purposes of Missouri’s section 558.031.1, RSMo., which proscribes when credit for time served is due.

So, in this common scenario, time served on the parole violation must be credited against the sentence on the new charges.  Where a person’s imprisonment on separate offenses stems from the same act, credit for time served must be given against each of the related offenses.

Law Office of Kurt H. King, 20 E. Franklin, Liberty, Clay County, Missouri 64068

816.781.6000

General Matters, Personal Injury, Workers’ Compensation, Family Law

February 24, 2016

Spoilation of Evidence Experience in Clay County, Missouri

Missouri history of sanctions for spoilation of evidence dates back to the 1882 case of Pomeroy v. Benton where the Court fashioned an adverse ruling against a defendant who concealed evidence of damages to his partner.  Many cases since address whether a court should grant an adverse inference or sanctions due to spoilation.

We argued this issue in a 2015 jury case in Clay County, Missouri, the Court ultimately denying request for an adverse inference based on what we believed to have been wrongful destruction of video of plaintiff’s fall captured by surveillance camera mounted on the exterior of the grocery store.  The store claimed to have mistakenly preserved video of the day after plaintiff’s fall, having taped over the day that plaintiff actually fell.  A risk manager for the chain store timely requested video of the fall–obtaining the “day after” video–but the store claimed it received no request for the correct video within the allotted 30 days after plaintiff’s fall.

The Circuit Court of Clay County, Missouri, apparently determined that the store did not intentionally destroy (by tape-over 30 days later) video of plaintiff’s fall, and/or that it did not do so with intent to defraud.

Note that months passed after the fall before the undersigned began representing plaintiff, and no letter issued shortly after plaintiff’s fall demanding the store preserve video and other evidence of the fall.  Such a preservation demand or other duty to preserve can be key.  We know not how the Court weighed our argument that: 1) the store immediately knew of the fall (its manager having assisted at the scene and reported the incident to superiors); 2) the video was in fact timely requested although that of the wrong date actually sent; and, 3) the store knew full well of a need to properly preserve video and other evidence of  customer injury known to it.  However, our impression is that the lack of an early demand for preservation of evidence was not decisive in this case to this judge.  Indeed, other courts indicate failure to have an adequate retention policy may constitute spoilation under certain circumstances.  But this store did have a preservation system in place, that being a 30 day tape over policy by  which previous video is simply taped over on the 31st day absent request to preserve made within 30 days.

P.S.–Weeks after this trial, a plaintiff’s attorney with a similar case against this defendant called for my thoughts.  He mentioned that the defendant store also lost/destroyed video of his client’s injury.  Wonder how often Hy-Vee fails to preserve and whether it is truly accidental?

Law Office of Kurt H. King, 20 E. Franklin, Liberty, Clay County, Missouri 64068; 816.781.6000

Personal Injury, Workers’ Compensation, Litigation, General Matters

February 9, 2016

Boarding & Pasture Liens On Horses and Other Animals in Missouri

Filed under: Litigation,Uncategorized — kurthking @ 9:53 pm
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Do liens attach to horses and animals when the pasture rent or boarding bill goes unpaid?  Yes, in Missouri.

Missouri’s section 430.150 lays it out–“Every person who shall keep, board, or train any horse, mule or other animal, shall, for the amount due therefor, have a lien on such animal, and on any vehicle, harness, or equipment coming into his possession therewith, and no owner or claimant shall have the right to take any such property out of the custody of the person having such lien, except with his consent or on the payment of such debt . . . .”

At least one Missouri case holds the “agister’s lien” granted by section 430.150 “squarely gives the lien” upon cattle pastured at $x per head per month.  Crouch v. Brookshire, 330 S.W.2d 592 (Mo. Ct. App. WD 1959).

See too Missouri’s 430.160, RSMo, for the procedure to enforce the lien, requiring the lien holder to sue in court to prove the amount owed and establish upon what property his lien attached in order to obtain a court order that the property be sold to satisfy the lien.

And note section 430.030, RSMo, granting a lien  to persons who furnish “labor or material on any horse, mule or other animal” upon written order therefor signed by the owner of the animal.  This law protects farriers, vets, and the like from non-payment for their goods and services, provided they have a signed order.

Law Office of Kurt H. King, 20 E. Franklin, Liberty, Clay County, Missouri, 816.781.6000

General Matters and Litigation, Personal Injury, Workers’ Compensation, Estate Planning, Family Law

January 6, 2016

Pre-Bankruptcy Judgments Are Not Liens Upon Post-Bankruptcy Real Property in Missouri

Filed under: Bankruptcy,Litigation,Uncategorized — kurthking @ 5:01 pm
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Absent fraud, and provided the judgment creditor was properly listed and included in the debtor’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy that resulted in Order of discharge of debt, pre-bankruptcy judgments are not liens upon real property acquired after the bankruptcy.  Title companies should not attempt to require releases of pre-bankruptcy judgments in order to clear title to real property that debtor legitimately acquired after the bankruptcy discharge order.  Case law to that effect includes:  Meyer v. Ragar, 935 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1996); Pruellage v. The De Seaton Corp., 407 S.W.2d 36 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1966); Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934).

Law Office of Kurt H. King

20 E. Franklin, Liberty, Clay County, Missouri 64068; 816.781.6000

Personal Injury, Missouri Workers’ Compensation, Civil Litigation, Family Law, and General Legal Matters

December 29, 2015

When Missouri Claim for Emotional Distress Should Be Stricken as Duplicative

Consider a case where plaintiff sues for trespass and includes a separate count for infliction of emotional distress, with both counts alleging the same trespass facts.

Know that an emotional distress claim cannot be maintained as a separate cause of action alongside the underlying tort claim for trespass (for instance) and recovery must be had under the traditional tort action.  K.B. v. R.T.R, 918 S.W.2d 795, 799 (Mo. 1996); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 316 (Mo. 1993).

Law Office of Kurt H. King

20 E. Franklin, Liberty, Clay County, Missouri 64068; 816.781.6000

Civil Litigation, Personal Injury, Workers’ Compensation, Family Law & General Matters

Proving Emotional Distress Where There Is No Physical Impact

To recover for emotional distress where there is no physical impact, the injured person must plead and prove the purported act directly caused emotional distress that is “medically diagnosable and medically significant.” Miller v. Wackenhut Services, 808 F.Supp. 697 (W.D.Mo. 1992), citing Hendrix v. Wainwright Industries, 755 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1988); Bass v. Nooney, 646 S.W.2d 765, 773 (Mo. 1983).  Expert medical testimony is generally required.

Law Office of Kurt H. King

20 E. Franklin, Liberty, Clay County, Missouri 64068; 816.781.6000

Civil Litigation, Personal Injury, Missouri Workers’ Compensation, Family Law, & General Matters

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